The CoHA and Peace Building: Will the CoHA resolve Amhara-Tigray Conflict or exacerbate it?

The Federal Government of Ethiopia and the Tigray People´s Liberation Front (TPLF) signed a
peace agreement, aka, Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (CoHA), in November 2022 to end the civil war that lasted for two years. Although the war involved the Ethiopian Federal Government, the TPLF (and its military wing, the Tigray Defense Force), the Eritrean Defense Forces, the Amhara Regional Force and Fano Militia to varying degrees, not all parties took part or represented in the peace agreement despite having vested interest in the outcome of the negotiation and the peace process.

The peace agreement, in a nutshell, is a restoration of the political status quo ante. This in practical terms means the restoration of the constitutional order where both parties retain and exercise their respective powers in line with the constitution and agree to mutually recognize each other as legitimate political actors. In addition, the parties have also agreed to settle contested territory issues on the basis of procedures set under the constitution; to address political differences through political dialogue; to facilitate Tigray regional election and its consequent representation in the government structure. In order to achieve these objectives, the agreement anticipates fulfillment of critical technical measures including cessation of hostilities, disarmament and demobilization of TPLF combatants, establishment of an interim regional administration and restoration of basic services and humanitarian access to the embattled region.

While many hail the peace agreement as a chance to secure lasting peace, key stumbling blocks remain which include the administrative boarder conflict between the Amhara and Tigray regional states considered among many as a zero-sum game. Some writers observe that the peace agreement should not have excluded the Amhara forces given they were direct and active participants in the civil war. They argue that at a bare minimum, procedural fairness would have required extensive consultations on security guarantees and future political arrangements between the two regions.

On the other hand, public perception of the peace process, particularly among those affected by the war, seems to have been given little consideration by the government although the successful enforcement of the agreement is linked to endorsement of processes and outcomes pertaining to the underlying issues.

The conflict over the contested territories between the Tigray and Amhara regional states is not a matter to be taken lightly either. The dispute existed long before the onset of the civil war and
served as fuel during the fighting. Fundamentally, it will remain a source of intractable conflict
and shadow over the future relationship as well as co-existence between the two peoples until such time that it is resolved. Analysis both at the domestic and international level strongly suggest that the Amhara people are to blame for the civil war then and stand as obstacles to the reconciliation process now. The narrative depicts Amharas as the main constituency for war and spoilers of peace aiming for political dominance of a centralized unitary state. However, others counter that while there is no doubt atrocities were committed by all sides in the conflict, this approach fails to take into account fundamental historical context between the two regions that is characterized by mistrust and legitimate fear of threat- shaping current and future relations with Tigray government particularly concerning the pending border issues.